

Doc. No. 2593-D (41)

page 1

Item 44

From: Bangkok.
To : Tokyo.
25 November 1941
(Purple)

#849 (In 2 parts, complete)

In the event of the Empire's taking decisive action in a southward advance, it will of course be necessary in the exercise of a belligerents rights to make clear the relations of sovereign and subjects. On the one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp. My conversation with Pibul as reported in my #834* was undertaken with this as the underlying motive. If and when Japan at last does make her proposals of joint defense, the following three points should be made especially definite, and Thai should be led to voluntarily take an attitude of cooperation with us.

(1) In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malay, there would of course be a temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand, but after our objectives have been attained, restoration would immediately be made, and the independence of Thai would be respected even more than at present while Thai is maintaining neutrality.

(2) In case she cooperates in a positive way with Japan, full assurances will be given that Thailand's swamp lands will be reclaimed in the areas concerned.

(3) In the event of Thai's assets in England being frozen great fluctuation would result in the value of Thai's money, but Japan would make available sufficient funds to create a foundation for a yen "bloc" money system, and also give every consideration to providing petroleum and other essential commodities.

To summarize: By cooperating with Japan the racial longings of Thailand will be realized, and with indivisible relations with Japan her existence as an independent nation will be strengthened ----- (three lines missed) --- stop with as simple a ----- as possible to the effect that "will cooperate in every way for the realization of the objectives of East Asia coprosperity and stability", while the particulars as necessity may require will be put into a secret treaty -----

Furthermore, in the light of Japan's basic national policy which has for its purpose the establishment of an East Asia coprosperity sphere, and the emancipation of the

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JD-1: 6844

(continued) (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (S-TT)

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Item 44

Asiatic peoples, it goes without saying that Thailand's sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the minimum limits of necessity, and that her standing as an independent nation must be maintained to the very last; while strictest military discipline must be used to reassure the Thai populace and strict control should by all means be exercised over any attempts at profiteering.

Have sent - - - by the hand of Consul General Asada who has returned to Japan, but to make doubly sure I am also cabling it to you.

*Available, Purple dated 21 November.

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JD-1:

SECRET

(F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (S-TT)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

6x 1188

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Stan 44

ベシコック 意
東 京 宛

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月二十五日

（案）

第八四九號（二部ヨリ成ル・完結部）

帝國が南方進出ニ必然タル行動ヲ採ル場合ニハ交
民國權利ノ行使トシテ君主ト臣民ノ關係ヲ明白ニ
スルコトが勿論必要トナル。一方ニ於テ泰國ヲ我
が陣營ニ引入レルコトが絕對ニ必要トナル。特電
第八三四號ニテ報告セシ通り一ビ^{ブル}ルト私トノ
會議ハ之レヲ第一ノ動機トシテ始メラレ、若シ日
本が後進ニ於テ共同防衛ノ提議ヲ爲セバ下記ノ三
點ハ特ニ明確ニサレ而シテ泰國ハ自意的ニ我方ト
協動ス可ク態度ヲ深ラシムル必要アリ。

- (一) 「ビルマ」及「マレー」ヲ攻撃スル場合ニハ
泰國ノ領土的主權ヲ一時侵害スルコトアルハ
勿論ナルモ然シ我方ノ目的ノ達成サレタル後
ハ直ニ返還ヲ爲シ而シテ泰山ノ獨立ハ泰國が
中立ヲ保持シテ居ル一現在ヨリモ一層尊重サ
レル可シ。
- (二) 泰國が日本ニ對シ積極的ニ協力スル場合ニハ

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泰國ノ經濟地ハ關係地獄ノ中ニ取長サレ、充
分ナル保證ガ與ヘラレル可シ

(三) 泰國ノ資産ガ英國ニテ凍結サレル場合ニハ泰
國貨幣價值ハ大ナル變動ヲ來タスモ日本ハ國
ブロッツク貨幣制度ノ差礙ヲ創設スベク十分ナ
ル資金ヲ流通シ而シテ亦石油及其他ノ重要物
資ヲ供給スルニ凡テノ努力ヲ拂フベシ。

略説スレバ日本トノ地方ニヨリ泰國ノ民族的熱
望ガ實現サレ而シテ日本ト不可分ノ關係ニ於テ獨
立國家トシテノ其存在ハ強固トナリ

「……………(三行脱着)……………」。
簡單ナ……………ヲ以ツテ止メ……………可能ナル、一東
亞ノ榮榮ト安定トノ目的實現ノ爲ニ凡テノ方法ニ
テ能力スベク……………」

他方ニ於テハ必要ヲ要スル詳細ハ秘密條約ニ入記
サレル可シ。……………」

茲、東亞榮榮圈ノ建設ト亞細亞民族ノ解位トラ
其目的トスル日本ノ基本國策ニ照シテ泰國ノ主權
ガ必要ノ最少限度以上ニハ保障サレザルコト獨立

2.

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國家トシテノ其立場ガ眞ニ最後マデ維持サレル可
キハ云フマデモナイ。

尙ホ泰國民衆ヲ安心サセルニ嚴格ナル軍規ガ行使
サレホベテラス。又嚴重ナル統制ニヨツテ如何ナ
ル不當利得行爲ニモ此レヲ適用スベシ。――
ヲ日本ヘ歸國セシ邊田總領事ニ手交シ送達セリ尙
ホ之レヲ重大確認スル意味ニ於テ貴下ニ對シ又打
電致シタル次第ナリ。

※入手可能 案十一月二十一日附

二五三八九 JD 1 / 秘密

(F) 海軍 編 11 / 27 / 41 (S-1 TT)

Doc. 2593 cert.

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸軍省参謀本部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、
添附數通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲
メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CARTER, W. CLARKE
カーター・ダヴリウー・クラーク

Doc. No. 2593-D(19)

Page 1

(Item 20)

TOP SECRET

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 Secret Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

TOP SECRET

(Item 20)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436

SECRET

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

TOP SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
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CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

書類番號二五九三〇十九號

第二十卷

機密

ワシントン發 東京宛

一九四一年／昭和十六年／十一月二十六日

紫色（大至急）

第一一八〇號（二ノ第一部）

野村、泰樹ヨリ

屢次往電ノ如ク乙案全部ヲ考慮セシムル見込ハ殆ンド無ク、一方時日ハ切迫、此ノ體ニテハ遺憾乍ラ交渉ハ先ツ決裂ノ外ナク、我々ノ失敗ト屈辱ハ決定的ナリ。此際唯一ノ打開策トシテハ、甚ダ恐懼ニ堪ヘザルモ、先ヅ「ルーズベルト」大統領ガ後世ノ爲メガ太平洋平和維持ノ爲ニ賜カスルコトヲ望ム旨ヲ貴方ニ電報スルコト（此ノ旨ニ關シ貴方ノ意見當方ニ打電サレ次第至方ヲ奉ゲテ之ガ手筈ヲ交渉ス）及ビ折返シ貴方ヨリ懸念ナル「メッセー」ヲ回答スルコトヲ提案シ得ベシ。之ニ依リ空氣ヲ一新スルト同時ニ今少シク時機ノ猶豫ヲ得ベシ。英米側ガ印ノ保護占領ニ出テ來ル可能性ヲモ考慮シ、我方ヨリ先手ヲ打ち、印、蘭印、泰ヲ包含スル中立國設立ヲ提案スルコト可然ト思考ス。（去ル九月「ルーズベルト」大統領

Dec 25 93 D (11)

Sten. 20

Ex 1189

1.

ガ印及泰西ノ中立ヲ要求セルハ承認知ノ通り)。

書類番號二五九三號 D十九號 第二十番

ワシントン機 東京宛

一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ十一月二十六日

紫色(大至急)

第一一八〇號(二ノ第二部)

我々ハ今回交渉ノ決裂ガ必ズシモ日米戦争ヲ意味セザルヤノ観測存スベキモ、決裂後ハ前述ノ如ク英米側ノ南印進駐モ最悪セラレ、延イテハ我方ノ攻撃ニヨル對英米衝突不可避ナルベク、右ニ對シ獨逸ガ條約第三條ニ依リ我方援助ノ義務ヲ應ズルヤ否ヤハ、頗ル疑問ニシテ、且日支事變ノ解決ハ今次世界戦ノ終局迄持テ越スノ外ナキニ至ルベシ。

本電ハ本使トシテ、最後ノ意見具申タルニ付、少ク共海軍大臣迄ハ御示シノ上至急折返シ何分ノ御回電切望ス。

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

ワシントン、二十五、D。

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ
添附復通ノ日本文電報ノ複製寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ
テ傍受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻
譯スル爲メ西洋人ニトリ人刀ノ可能ナル限度ニ於
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE
カーター・ダヴリエー・クラーク